Including pride and its group-based, relational, and contextual features in theories of contempt by Sullivan, Gavin Brent
  
Including pride and its group-based, 
relational, and contextual features in 
theories of contempt 
 
Sullivan, GB 
 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Sullivan, GB 2016, 'Including pride and its group-based, relational, and contextual 
features in theories of contempt' Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol 40, pp. 38-39 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1600087X  
 
DOI 10.1017/S0140525X1600087X 
ISSN 0140-525X 
ESSN 1469-1825 
 
Publisher: Cambridge University Press 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
Including pride and its group-based, relational, and contextual 
features in theories of contempt 
Gavin Brent Sullivan 
Centre for Research in Psychology, Behaviour and Achievement, Coventry 
University, Coventry, CV1 5FB, UK. 
gavin.sullivan@coventry.ac.uk 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-directories/researchers/gavin-
sullivan/ 
Abstract: Sentiment addresses emotional and enduring attitudinal features of 
contempt, but explaining contempt as a mixture of basic emotion system affects 
does not adequately address the family resemblance structure of the concept. 
Adding forms of individual, group-based, and widely shared arrogance and 
contempt is necessary to address complex mixed feelings of proud superiority 
when “looking down on” and acting harshly towards others. 
 
When Hume (1739/2001) wrote about moral emotions, he argued: “Contempt or scorn 
has such a strong tincture of pride, that there scarce is any other passion discernible” (p. 
249). According to Norton (2001), Hume argued that contempt is “a mixture of hatred 
and pride arising from the experience of the negative features of another person” (p. 161). 
Although it might be argued that the folk affect concept of contempt has changed 
markedly since the 18th century, a more parsimonious explanation is that pride is an 
important omission from Gervais & Fessler’s (G&F’s) Attitude–Emotion–Scenario 
(AES) model. 
 Claiming that pride is part of the complex family resemblance (Wittgenstein 
1953/2001) of conceptual relations means examining the criteria for ascribing contempt 
and pride in contrast to (and excluding) their respective opposites of respect and humility. 
Moreover, pride, anger, and disgust should be included in the family resemblance 
structure of contempt because these are manifestations of a devaluation of and sense of 
superiority over other individuals and groups. It is important to clarify that pride is not 
discussed here as a form of positive self-evaluative emotion based upon “authentic” 
personal achievements recognized by others (Tracy & Robins 2007). Rather, it is 
“hubristic pride” (Tracy & Robins 2007), which suggests a lack of concern for others 
(e.g., opponents) when celebrating one’s achievements, abilities, or affiliations and a 
tendency towards self-aggrandizement and arrogance. Depending upon the context, 
intensity (Holbrook et al. 2014), and repetition of such displays, a consistently arrogant 
stance when comparing oneself with or simply relating to others tends to be associated 
with the type of description of a “proud man” discussed by Hume (1739/2001). The 
account of proud arrogance and aloof or “cold” superiority and anger or disgust 
advocated here is therefore consistent with a dispositional negative character of a 
contemptuous person. However, pace G&F I argue that expressions of disgust, anger, and 
arrogant pride form a family resemblance structure of complex similarities and 
differences, which allows these quite distinct discrete emotions to be examined as 
manifestations of a superior or devaluating attitude towards another person or group. 
 On my account, both “hot” and “cold” forms of arrogant pride should be included 
in G&F’s analysis of contempt. Similar but limited recognition of a role for pride is 
acknowledged in Fischer and Giner-Sorolla’s (2016) competing analysis of contempt as a 
dynamic emotion. Fischer and Giner-Sorolla present contempt as a complex mix of 
emotions, expressive behaviours experienced, and actions during interactions with others 
that potentially varies from laughter to hate, but people do not tend to vacillate between 
contempt and more positive emotions. Both analyses rightfully emphasise that contempt 
is about the other person or group and their lack of worth and only implicitly about one’s 
superiority. However, pointing out that a person is expressing contempt or enjoys 
dominating and demeaning others (e.g., as an individual or on behalf of group) might, of 
course, be experienced as identifying the person’s conduct as shameful; that is, unless the 
context is one in which the contemptuous person’s prestige or status reflects individual or 
group-based power as well as the confidence and certainty that criticism of his or her 
sentiment can be easily rebuffed. 
 Such contexts indicate the importance of group-based individual and even widely 
shared collective emotional forms of relational emotions (Sullivan, 2014). By including 
pride in the AES model, we can see how complex interpersonal relations are important in 
contexts in which imbalances of power are maintained between individuals. For example, 
it is not always that case that pride is a matter of one’s superiority over others or that the 
grounds for arrogance reside solely in the deficiencies, errors, or weaknesses of other 
persons or groups. The appraised lower value of others and perceptions based upon social 
appraisals such as being influenced by the contempt of influential group leaders and 
perpetuated by propaganda, disinformation, and a lack of meaningful intergroup contact.  
 Evidence for complex mixed and group-based combinations of contempt with 
other emotions is demonstrated by Becker et al.’s (2011) finding that negative outgroup-
directed anger and contempt was experienced simultaneously with positive self-directed 
emotions (which included personal pride) as a result of engaging in collective action. 
Moreover, as Bar-Tal et al. (2007) have outlined with respect to intractable conflicts, 
emotions like anger and disgust towards other groups may become part of a background 
collective emotional orientation of a given society. Occasions of group pride that are 
widely shared and form a background to individual group-based expressions or 
internalizations of contempt for others are therefore worth incorporating into the AES 
model, even if only to identity how the rehumanisation of devalued others occurs and 
contempt expressed towards individuals and groups is overcome, in some cases, by the 
actions of the “targets” of the sentiment themselves. If such reconciliation is impossible, 
then contempt may indeed signal that the other person (or group) is individually or 
socially “appraised as unworthy or inferior and the relation as beyond reconciliation” 
(van der Lӧwe & Parkinson 2014:130). 
 In this commentary, I argued that contempt has a family resemblance conceptual 
structure with multiple overlapping criteria. Hubristic or arrogant pride should be 
analysed as part of the conceptual relations of contempt with disgust and anger. The 
enduring interactional and relational features of the proud or arrogant individual who 
“looks down upon” other individuals or groups also should be included in a manner that 
can address G&F’s focus on sentiment as a combination of basic affect mixtures and 
enduring attitudes. In the right context, diverse expressive and performative behaviour 
such as a lip curl, laughter, or indifference can be interpreted as individual, group-based, 
or even widely shared collective forms of contempt. Scenarios in which a person might 
feel completely justified and certain in their devaluation of another person or group 
therefore require close attention to matters of identity and power. This may include 
certainty of the inferiority of an individual or collective other that renders reconciliation 
(or mutual recognition) unlikely and reflects a background group moral ethos that is 
reinforced by social appraisals of the contempt towards a given target displayed by 
individuals or groups that the appraiser does respect. 
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